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INCREASED TAX LIABILITY AWARDS AFTER ESHELMAN
I.	INTRODUCTION

When employees bring suit against their employers for violations of law, they
generally seek an order for backpay.1 By grant of Congress, federal courts hold the
power to make this equitable remedy under various employment and civil rights
statutes.2 Backpay is not an automatic component of an employment plaintiff ’s award,
but it is commonly viewed as the most effective way to place a plaintiff in the same
position she would have been absent her employer’s illegal action. 3 In other words,
courts use backpay awards to “make the [employment] plaintiff whole” for the injury
suffered.4
Recognizing that the amount of withheld wages or benefits is, at times,
insufficient to fully compensate a plaintiff who suffered an illegal employment action,
courts sometimes award additional monetary amounts to employment plaintiffs,
including attorney’s fees and “prejudgment interest” awards.5 Attorney’s fees, if not
1.

See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419, 421 (1964) (“The ‘make whole’ purpose of
Title VII is made evident by the legislative history. The backpay provision was expressly modeled on the
backpay provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Under that Act, ‘[m]aking the workers whole for
losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which
the Board enforces. . . . [G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate [Title VII’s] central statutory purposes . . . .’”
(quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941))); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 774 n.34 (1976); Armco Emps. Indep. Fed’n, Inc. v. AK Steel Corp., 149 F. App’x. 347 (6th
Cir. 2005).

2.

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (“If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be
of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate
the policies of this [Act].”); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of
section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment,
reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.”); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2006) (“A civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (“If the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include . . . any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”); Frazen v.
Ellis Corp., 543 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2008); Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 3:07cv502, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78496, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2010).

3.

Colwell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78496, at *4–5; see Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1121 (3d
Cir. 1980) (“The necessity of adopting a standard of relief which would restore the victim as fully as
possible to the economic position in which s/he would have been in the absence of the employment
discrimination has been recognized by this court which has, in numerous cases, adopted the ‘make
whole’ standard.”).

4.

See, e.g., Hurley v. Racetrac Petroleum, 146 F. App’x. 365, 368 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farley v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)).

5.

Courts also award postjudgment interest. See, e.g., Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir.
2006) (“Prejudgment interest, as the term suggests, accrues for the period before entry of judgment.
Interest after entry of judgment is addressed through postjudgment interest, which accrues on the

712

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

included in a judgment against an employer, can significantly reduce a plaintiff ’s
make-whole backpay remedy by requiring a plaintiff to pay her attorney with her
hard-earned, unpaid compensation made available by the court’s award; Congress
remedied this situation by providing courts with the discretion under most federal
employment statutes to require a violating employer to pay a plaintiff ’s attorney fees.6
Because of the protracted nature of litigation, the need to take into account the timevalue of money, and the lost investment power of delayed compensation, courts also
typically provide awards of prejudgment interest—a percentage-based backpay-award
increase—on backpay claims to ensure full compensation for the plaintiff ’s loss.7
Since 1984, a separate and equally necessary supplement to a plaintiff ’s makewhole backpay remedy has emerged in the courts, designed to offset a plaintiff ’s
increased tax liability caused by her award’s lump-sum distribution. 8 Its late
appearance in civil rights and employment litigation is due to various historical
factors explored in Part II. While courts tend to use differing nomenclature for this
remedy, this note will refer to it as an “increased tax liability award” (ITLA).9
Unlike tort awards for personal injuries, backpay awards made to successful
employment plaintiffs constitute taxable income.10 Because backpay is normally
awarded in one lump sum,11 the entire award amount is subject to taxation as gross
income in the awarded year.12 This presents at least two potential problems for
successful employment plaintiffs.13 First, a plaintiff may have obtained a better job
amount of a damage award, including prejudgment interest, from the date judgment was entered to the
date of payment.”).
6.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–33 (1983). Attorney’s fees, unlike
prejudgment interest, are treated as an award independent of plaintiff ’s compensation for her injury. See
Sinyard v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001).

7.

See Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72137, at *3 (D.V.I. Aug. 14, 2009) (“As a
general rule, prejudgment interest is to be awarded when . . . the relief granted would otherwise fall
short of making the claimant whole because he or she has been denied the use of the money which was
legally due.”).

8.

See Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984).

9.

See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing the increased tax burden as a
“negative tax consequence”); Dashnaw v. Pena, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing ITLAs
as “gross-ups” of backpay to cover tax liability).

10.

United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992).

11.

One argument against ITLAs is that instead of making one or two lump-sum distributions, a court
should distribute the backpay award in a way that avoids increasing a plaintiff ’s tax burden. However,
this argument, if given effect, further deprives the plaintiff of her earned compensation, potentially for
long additional periods and without the plaintiff ’s acquiescence (as opposed to a trust, for example).
This would force a plaintiff to choose between waiting for a longer period to receive the full award, or
receiving a smaller award in one lump sum because of the increased tax liability it creates. This is no
choice at all, and cuts against the make-whole nature of the award. Thus, the argument is unavailing,
and courts should act to ensure plaintiffs receive their due compensation as soon as possible.

12.

See Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.

13.

This note does not focus on issues that may arise through the application of the Alternative Minimum
Tax (AMT); however, successful plaintiffs might also be subject to increased tax liabilities as a result of
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with a higher salary between the date of the illegal employment action and the date
that the judgment is finally rendered in her favor. If that plaintiff ’s new salary places
her in a higher tax bracket, the lump sum backpay award will be taxed at a higher
rate than if the pay had been received when earned, thus reducing the plaintiff ’s
make-whole remedy through increased taxation.14 Second, a plaintiff ’s lump-sum
award, by itself, can place her in a higher tax bracket for the taxable year in which the
award was made. In this circumstance, it is not just the backpay award that is taxed
at a higher rate; it is the plaintiff ’s entire earnings for the tax year in which the lumpsum judgment is received, resulting in a potentially greater tax liability increase than
in the first instance.15
To remedy both situations, a court should, pursuant to the applicable damages
provisions of employment statutes, provide an award to offset the increased tax
liability incurred by virtue of receiving the backpay in one lump sum. In light of
Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc., a Third Circuit case which held that ITLAs are
available for claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this note calls
for greater acceptance of ITLAs in the employment discrimination context, and
steps further to advocate for the award’s applicability in other non-discrimination
employment claims.16 Part II explains why the issue of ITLAs has become more
pressing in recent years due to Congress’s failed experiment with income averaging—
the taxation of income over a period of years rather than a single year. Part III
analyzes favorable case law on this issue and confronts court decisions that have
refused to make ITLAs, focusing on how the Eshelman decision has undercut prior
negative case law; it also describes how courts should treat uncertainties in futuretax-burden calculations, and dispels constitutional concerns of impermissible additur.
Part IV discusses precedent that supports the expansion of this award from
employment discrimination cases to other employment statutes that provide backpay
or monetary employment-benefit awards. Part V offers concluding remarks.

AMT application as well. See Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination
Remedies and Tax Gross Ups, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 67, 78–91 (2004).
14.

In 2010, the most extreme example would be a plaintiff who jumped from the lowest tax bracket, 10%,
to the highest tax bracket, 35%, in the time between the illegal employment action and the receipt of
the final judgment. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History: Income Years 1913–2010, Tax Foundation,
at 1 (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Federal Income Tax Rates History], http://www.taxfoundation.org/
publications/show/151.html#fed_individual_rate_history-20100923.

15.

See Polsky & Befort, supra note 13, at 74–76 (demonstrating that a plaintiff making $40,000 per year
who should have made $65,000 per year but for ten years of discrimination, and who received a judgment
of backpay and frontpay of $350,000, incurs an increased tax liability of $23,522 through the lump-sum
disbursement); see also Barry Ben-Zion, Neutralizing the Adverse Tax Consequences of a Lump-Sum Award
in Employment Cases, 13 J. Forensic Econ. 233 (2000) (providing an excellent explanation and
examination of both the existence of this inequity and the proper way to calculate an award).

16.

554 F.3d 426, 440 (3d. Cir. 2009).

714

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

II.	CONGRESS’S EXPERIMENT WITH INCOME AVERAGING: HOW THE ADVANCEMENT
AND SUBSEQUENT REPEAL OF INCOME AVERAGING CREATED THE NEED FOR ITLAs

The tax inequity problem with backpay awards emerged because of a series of tax
policy decisions, culminating with the elimination of income averaging from the
Internal Revenue Code. Income averaging—the use of multiple years’ income, rather
than a single year’s income, to determine an individual’s tax burden—is an idea that
began gaining traction in the United States during the 1930s as the country dealt
with the Great Depression.17 Generally speaking, government tax systems work on
an annual basis: a government will tax a taxpayer’s annual income at a specified
rate.18 While this makes sense for salaried and hourly employees, it makes less sense
for those who do not receive income at regular, annual rates. A frequently cited
example is that of a novelist.19 Novelist A works for three years writing and editing
her masterpiece, receiving no income during that time. The novel is published in the
fourth year, and A receives a significant amount of income from the novel’s sale,
enough to place A in the highest tax bracket. Under the annual system, A is taxed in
year four for wealth that was created over the span of four years. The result is that
the government taxes a salaried employee who makes the same amount as A over that
four-year span at a lesser rate (assuming the employee’s salary places her in a lower
tax bracket than A) because of the way that employee’s income was distributed over
the span of years.20
Some economists have argued that a tax system can remedy this horizontal
inequity21 through the use of income averaging: instead of taxing an individual
17.

See Comm’r v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for
Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. Pol. Econ. 379 (1939).

18.

Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Ctr. for Tax Policy Admin., OECD Tax Database, OECD, www.
oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

19.

See Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity,
1984 Duke L.J. 509, 552–57; see also S. Rep. No. 76-648, at 7 (1939), reprinted in 105 Internal Revenue
Acts of the United States 1909–1950: Legislative Histories, Laws, and Administrative
Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter Legislative Histories].

20. To place numbers in this example, say that A made $400,000 in year four. Employee B receives $100,000

per year. Using tax data during the years 2007–2010, A must pay $117,644 in federal taxes over the fouryear span (nothing paid in 2007–2009, and taxes paid on $400,000 in 2010), while employee B pays
$87,518 (four-year total of taxes paid on B’s annual salary). Thus, while A and B received the same
amount of income from 2007–2010, A must pay $30,126 more in taxes. Federal Tax Brackets,
Moneychimp, http://www.moneychimp.com/features/tax_brackets.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010)
(online tax calculator).

21.

Horizontal equity in a tax system exists where two similarly situated taxpayers are taxed the same way.
See Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 546 (“The fairness of a tax system involves two quite distinct elements.
First, the system should avoid making arbitrary distinctions among more or less equally situated
individuals; the system should not burden some individuals significantly more than others on the basis
of trivial differences in economic status. Second, the system should distribute the overall burden fairly,
but not necessarily evenly, among groups of taxpayers whose receipt of governmental benefits, and
ability to bear tax burdens, may differ widely. The two concepts are generally referred to as horizontal
equity and vertical equity, respectively.” (footnotes omitted)). For an example of horizontal inequity, see
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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annually, income averaging would allow an individual to determine her appropriate
tax rate by averaging her income over a period of years and pay taxes at the rate
applicable to her average annual income.22 Professor Schmalbeck provides a relatively
straightforward explanation using tax data from 1984:
A taxpayer who has for several years earned a salary of $10,000 will note a
dramatic increase in her marginal tax rate if she wins $100,000 in a lottery.
Much of that income will be taxed at rates as high as forty-five percent. 23 But
if the taxpayer is allowed to divide the extra amount into five $20,000 slices,
and to compute her tax as though one slice had been received in each of the
five most recent tax years, then the lottery winnings will be taxed at the
substantially lower rates that apply to incremental incomes between her
$10,000 normal income and a hypothetical $30,000 income. 24

Congress passed a limited income averaging provision as part of the Revenue Act
of 1939, providing averaging for compensation “received[] for personal services”
completed over a period of five years or more when 95% of that compensation was
paid upon the completion of those services. 25 Congress intended this provision to
alleviate the horizontal inequity faced by “writers, inventors, and others who work
for long periods of time without pay and then receive their full compensation upon
the completion of their undertaking.” 26 The Revenue Act of 1942 modified and
broadened § 107 after Congress found the “personal services” requirement unduly
limiting.27 The 1942 bill changed the performance period of personal services from
five years to thirty-six months, lowered the amount required to be paid at completion
of the personal service to 80% of the total compensation, and included a new provision
to cover compensation obtained from “artistic work or inventions.”28
22.

See Vickrey, supra note 17.

23.

Professor Schmalbeck uses tax data from 1984, the year this material was published.

24.

Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 513.

25.

Revenue Act of 1939 § 220, Pub. L. No. 76-155 (originally codified as 26 U.S.C. § 107 (1939))
(recodified and incorporated in 1954 into I.R.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1303, 1307(a)-(b)). “[T]he bill
provide[d] that with respect to compensation for personal services rendered by an individual over a
period of 5 or more years and which is paid only on the completion of such services the tax attributable
to such compensation shall not be more than the tax attributable to such compensation shall not be
more than the aggregate of taxes which would have been paid had the income been received in equal
portions in each of the years in the period.” S. Rep. No. 76-648 (1939), reprinted in 105 Legislative
Histories, supra note 19, at 7.

26. S. Rep. No. 76-648 (1939), reprinted in 105 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 7.
27.

Revenue Act of 1942 § 139, Pub. L. No. 77-753 (originally codified as 26 U.S.C. § 107(a)–(c) (1942));
H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333 (1942), reprinted in 108 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 91 (“Under
the existing law, authors, composers, inventors, and other individuals who work on artistic, literary, or
musical compositions or inventions over an extended period of time and receive the bulk of their
compensation for such work in one taxable year are in many instances excluded from the benefits of
section 107 because their work, or their patent or copyright covering such work, does not consist of or
involve the rendering of personal services.”).

28. See Revenue Act of 1942 § 139, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 837 (1942) (originally codified as 26

U.S.C. § 107(a)–(c) (1942), incorporated in 1954 into I.R.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1307(a)).
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The next year, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1943, which again amended
§ 107 to include § 107(d), a provision granting backpay recipients the ability to
income average when the recipient received a lump-sum amount greater than 15% of
her gross income for the tax year in which the lump sum was received.29 The provision
ensured that employment plaintiffs, if able to come under the section, would not pay
a greater tax on the backpay award than if their compensation was received when
earned.30
The 1943 Act provided a broad definition of backpay:
Remuneration, including wages, salaries, retirement pay, and other similar
compensation, which is received or accrued during the taxable year by an
employee for services performed before the taxable year for his employer and
which would have been paid before the taxable year except for the intervention
of . . . (ii) dispute as to the liability of the employer to pay such remuneration,
which is determined after the commencement of court proceedings. 31

The bill’s legislative history explains that Congress intended the new provision to
provide employment plaintiffs who received backpay under the National Labor
Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, at the time both relatively new
statutes themselves, 32 with a mechanism to avoid “a greater income tax than if [the
backpay] had been received in the years from which it [arose].”33 Thus, beginning in
1943, most employment plaintiffs were able to avoid any increased tax liability that
resulted from actions to recover unpaid wages or benefits through use of § 107(d).
29. Revenue Act of 1943 § 119, Pub. L. 78-235, 58 Stat. 21, 39 (1944) (originally codified as 26 U.S.C. 107(d)

(1944), incorporated in 1954 into I.R.C. § 1303). Congress passed this legislation despite a presidential veto.
See H.R. REP. No. 78-443 (1944), reprinted in 110 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 1; Joseph J.
Thorndike, Wartime Tax Legislation and the Politics of Policymaking, TaxAnalysts (Oct. 21, 2001), http://
www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/0/f9cb12c7ca3ccf9185256e22007840e7?OpenDocument.

30. H.R. REP. No. 78-443 (1944), reprinted in 110 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 23 (“If the

amount of the back pay received or accrued by an individual during the taxable year exceeds 15 per
centum of the gross income of the individual of such year, the part of the tax attributable to the inclusion of
such back pay in gross income for the taxable year shall not be greater than the aggregate of the increases in the
taxes which would have resulted from the inclusion of the respective portions of such back pay in gross income for
the taxable years to which such portions are respectively attributable, as determined under regulations
prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.” (emphasis added)).

31.

Revenue Act of 1943 § 119, reprinted in 110 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 23.

32.

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).

33.

H.R. Rep. No. 78-443 (1944), reprinted in 110 Legislative Histories, supra note 19, at 48 (“As a
result of an alleged unfair labor practice of his employer under the National Labor Relations Act [or] an
alleged violation of section 6 or 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . , an individual taxpayer
may receive during the taxable year back pay which is in part attributable to one or more prior years. In
this event the back pay may be subject to a greater income tax than if it had been received in the years
from which it arises. . . . Under the new section, the tax on such back pay is limited to the aggregate of
the taxes which would be attributable to that pay if the portions of the pay attributable to prior years
were included in gross income for those years according to the amount arising from each such year for
which payment is made.”).
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In 1954, Congress passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, legislation that
replaced the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and in many ways revamped the tax
system.34 At that time, the House Committee on Ways and Means (“Committee”)
debated the inclusion of a broader income averaging provision that could be used by
any taxpayer.35 The farming lobby, organized labor, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
and the American Bar Association, among others, worked in a concerted effort to
support such legislation.36 Statements made to the Committee focused on similar
themes: the particular tax difficulties of industries that do not operate on an annual
cycle, 37 the need to provide economic incentive for projects and contracts that will
continue beyond a single year, 38 and the heightened importance of income averaging
in a highly progressive taxation scheme for taxpayers with irregular or fluctuating
income.39
In the end, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 did not include a general income
averaging provision, and Congress settled for re-codifying the existing income
averaging measures.40 But only ten years later, Congress gave effect to the arguments
made in 1954 by passing the Revenue Act of 1964, legislation which replaced the
previous income averaging provisions with a new scheme allowing the general
population to income average over a five-year period.41
The legislative history of the 1964 bill gives three reasons for extending income
averaging to the general population. First, the prior provisions were “limited to a
relatively small proportion of the situations where averaging is needed. Thus, while
they presumably cover[ed] inventors and writers, they d[id] not provide for actors,
athletes, and in most cases d[id] not provide for attorneys, architects, and others.”42
34. I.R.C. (Supp. II 1954); see Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post-World War II Corporate Tax Reform,

73 Law & Contemp. Probs. 207, 208 (2010) (“It was not until 1954, though, as part of a comprehensive
revamp of the Internal Revenue Code, that Congress enacted limited, and ultimately short-lived,
dividend tax relief.”); see generally James John Jurinski, Tax Reform: A Reference Handbook
96–99 (2000) (providing a brief history of U.S. tax law).

35.

See 3 Legislative Histories, supra note 19.

36. Id.
37.

See, e.g., id. at 278 (“The application of sharply progressive surtax rates under the Federal income-tax
law, it is generally recognized, is inequitable in respect to individuals with irregular and fluctuating
income.”).

38. See, e.g., id. at 248–51.
39.

See, e.g., id. at 298. In 1954, the U.S. marginal tax rate was 20–91%, and the tax system employed
twenty-four brackets. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 14, at 56.

40. I.R.C. §§ 1301–1304 (Supp. II 1954).
41.

I.R.C. §§ 1301–1305 (1964); see Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 510 (“In 1964, however, after prolonged
debate among tax analysts, and in response to President Kennedy’s request, Congress enacted, in the
Revenue Act of 1964, general income averaging provisions that applied to any eligible electing taxpayer
whose current year’s income was sufficiently greater—as defined by the statute—than his average
income over the preceding four years.” (footnotes omitted)).

42.

S. Rep. No. 88-830, at 127 (1964) (“The absence of any general averaging device has worked particular
hardships on professions or types of work where incomes tend to fluctuate. This is true, for example, in
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Second, the prior provisions were “unduly complicated in practice because of the
requirement that the prior years’ incomes and taxes must be recomputed as if the
income had actually been received in those prior years.”43 Third, both the House and
Senate reports state that “income averaging should be designed to treat everyone as
nearly equally for tax purposes as possible.”44
Absent from the legislative history is any discussion of the legislation’s effect on
employment plaintiffs, despite the fact that the new scheme rolled back their ability
to make themselves whole through the tax system. While the 1964 bill provided
taxpayers generally with the ability to income average, it effectively limited employee
plaintiffs who received lump-sum backpay awards to averaging their income over a
five-year period rather than over the entire period for which backpay was awarded.45
When plaintiffs brought this inequity to the attention of courts, they refused to order
employers that violated employment statutes to pay for plaintiffs’ increased tax
liability on backpay awards, reasoning that the general income averaging provisions
in effect were sufficient, if not perfect, to mitigate any losses incurred by plaintiffs.46
In the early 1980s, academics began to question the wisdom of income averaging.47
Professor Schmalbeck analyzed the provisions in a 1984 article, explaining that while
the Internal Revenue Code provided a well-defined income-averaging scheme, as
evidenced by the lack of litigation over it, onerous eligibility calculations likely led to
intimidation of and mistakes by taxpayers attempting to use the provisions.48 He
posited that, as a result, “the tax return preparation industry . . . . may be the principle
beneficiary of the averaging provisions.”49 Schmalbeck went on to find that the
provisions not only did little to encourage economic growth50 and resulted in a sizable
the cases of authors, professional artists, actors, and athletes as well as farmers, fishermen, attorneys,
architects, and others.”).
43.

Id.

44. Id.
45.

Compare I.R.C. § 1303 (Supp. II 1954), with I.R.C. §§ 1301–1305 (1964). See also Sears v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 749 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it included a tax component in its judgment to compensate class members for
their additional tax liability as a result of receiving seventeen years of back pay in one lump sum).

46. See Blim v. W. Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The back pay will be paid in a single

year, reported in that year, and taxed at the rates then in effect. However, the tax laws contain five-year
averaging provisions that will eliminate nearly all of any penalty that would otherwise result from
receipt of a lump sum payment.” (citations omitted)); Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1985),
enforced, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Sears, 749 F.2d at 1456 (discussed infra Part III.B).

47.

Schmalbeck, supra note 19; see Henry J. Aaron, How to Make the President’s Good Tax Reform Plan Even
Better, 3 The Brookings Rev. 3, 8 (1985); Edward Yorio, The President’s Tax Proposals: A Step in the
Right Direction, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1255, 1267 (1985).

48. Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 531–32.
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id. at 535 (“Averaging has little impact on capital formation, and the revenue impact, although

appreciable in absolute terms, has never amounted to as much as .2% of the gross national product.”).
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amount of lost revenue,51 but, more fundamentally, the scheme also failed to serve its
primary purpose: to alleviate horizontal inequity within the progressive tax
system.52
In addition to scholarly critiques, changes to tax policy in the 1980s made general
income averaging provisions less necessary for most taxpayers. When President
Ronald Reagan took office, he slashed the marginal tax rate from 14–70% in 1981 to
12–50% in 1982.53 In his 1985 State of the Union address, President Reagan called
for a bipartisan reform of the Internal Revenue Code to promote “fairness, simplicity,
and growth, making this economy the engine of our dreams and America the
investment capital of the world.”54 That reform took shape in the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Among other things, the bill reduced the marginal tax rate to 11–38.5% in
1987 and 15–28% in 1988.55 Additionally, the bill reduced the number of tax brackets
from sixteen in 1986 to five in 1987 and four in 1988.56 A reduction of the marginal
tax rate, coupled with the reduction in number of tax brackets, made general income
averaging provisions less necessary to create horizontal equity for those with
fluctuating incomes because the actions reduced the potential amount of loss (through
lower rates) and reduced the potential to receive inequitable treatment (by increasing
the size of each tax bracket).57
In response to these changes, the 1986 legislation also repealed the general
income averaging provisions, removing the ability for taxpayers to average their
income over any period of years.58 The legislative history explained that because the
bill created
wider brackets with fewer rates and a flatter rate structure, . . . there is no
longer sufficient justification to retain [income averaging] in light of its
complexity. . . . [F]luctuations in annual income will not change the taxpayer’s

51.

Id. at 511 (“More than six and a half million returns filed for the 1981 tax year included an election to
apply income averaging, resulting in an aggregate savings to the electing taxpayers of nearly four billion
dollars.” (footnote omitted)).

52.

Id. at 557–61, 564 (“The argument above suggests that outright repeal of the income averaging provisions
would save considerable tax revenue, improve the vertical equity of the tax system, and put the horizontal
equity of the tax system on a sounder footing by consistently using an annual rather than a multiyear
standard of measurement. Because immediate and complete repeal is a somewhat radical suggestion, it
may be worthwhile to explore some alternative ideas for legislative initiatives that are somewhat more
modest.”).

53.

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; see Federal Income Tax History,
supra note 14.

54. President Ronald Wilson Reagan, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Feb. 6,

1985), http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/5681.

55.

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; see Federal Income Tax History, supra note 14.

56. See Federal Income Tax History, supra note 14.
57.

See Polsky & Befort, supra note 13, at 77–78 (“That Act significantly flattened the tax rate structure,
reducing the top rate from 50% to 28%. Because of the flattening of rates, the Act substantially reduced
the potential adverse consequences caused by bunching.”).

58. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 141, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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marginal tax rate as frequently, and in many cases will not change it as much,
as under present law.59

The House Report further explained that the “complexities of income averaging
under present law derive both from the arithmetical calculations that it requires and
also from the rules governing eligibility.”60 By citing reasons similar to those used to
expand income averaging twenty-two years earlier, i.e., the simplification of the tax
law, Congress ended its experiment with income averaging.
Again, Congress did not focus on the effect its actions would have on employment
plaintiffs. The legislative history does not once mention backpay awards. In its effort
to simplify the Internal Revenue Code, Congress cut with a sword rather than a
scalpel; the end result left employment plaintiffs to seek the help of the courts to
protect themselves from the unintended, inequitable impact of the tax system on
lump-sum backpay awards.
III.	Appealling to the courts: the reasons and policies underlying the
current circuit split over ITLAs

A. Backpay Awards Constitute Taxable Income Under the Internal Revenue Code

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) currently considers backpay awards to be
taxable “gross income” under the Internal Revenue Code, a view well supported by
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.61 Most recently, in Commissioner v. Schleier, a plaintiff
59.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-426 (1985).

60. Id. If you find this explanation is too sparse for your taste, you are not alone. Polsky & Befort, supra note

13, at 78 n.46. My high school U.S. history professor, Father Jeffery Harrison, explained to me that
when conducting a historical analysis, it is imperative to ask the question “Cui bono?”, which translates
from the Latin as, “Who benefits?” That inquiry may shed light on some of the unarticulated motivations
behind this repeal. In 1969, Congress again amended 26 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. with the Revenue Act of
1969. Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 311, 83 Stat. 564. That amendment allowed the inclusion for averaging
purposes of long-term capital gains, gifts, and income received through wagers. Anthony J. Cataldo
II & Arline A. Savage, U.S. Individual Federal Income Taxation: Historical, Contemporary,
and Prospective Policy Issues 252 (2001). This liberalization led to a spike in the use of income
averaging, from approximately 600,000 taxpayers in 1969 to approximately one million in 1970. Id. The
alterations of the 1969 bill made the provisions less about horizontal equity and more about providing
tax breaks for the wealthy, particularly those who “struck it rich” through investments or received sizable
gifts from family. In this context, income averaging could be seen as an idea twisted around upon itself;
initially meant to make the system more equitable, in the end it provided a tax break for more
sophisticated, wealthy taxpayers. Perhaps Congress, in its zeal to end this seeming “tax break,”
overlooked the reasoning behind the 1943 bill and focused only on what the primary use of income
averaging had become when enacting its repeal.

61.

See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (holding backpay awarded under Title VII constitutes
gross income); Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) (holding backpay awarded under National
Labor Relations Act constitutes gross income); Tim Canney, Comment, Tax Gross-Ups: A Practical
Guide to Arguing and Calculating Awards for Adverse Tax Consequences in Discrimination Suits, 59 Cath.
U.L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (2010). Backpay is a term of art that encompasses more than past wages owed.
Such an award includes any type of compensation that is illegally withheld, including bonuses, vacation
pay, pension benefits, health care benefits, and regular wages. 5-142 Labor and Employment Law §
142.04 (Matthew Bender 2011).
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brought a successful claim for backpay and liquidated damages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).62 On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that
the IRS acted improperly by considering his ADEA backpay award as taxable gross
income under 26 U.S.C. § 61.63 While that section defines “gross income” as “all
income from whatever source derived,”64 the plaintiff pointed to an exception to that
definition found in 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2).65 Section 104(a)(2) states that “gross
income does not include . . . the amount of damages received . . . on account of
personal injury or sickness.”66 The Supreme Court held that the phrase “on account
of personal injury or sickness” does not include turning sixty years old (plaintiff
argued that the adverse employment action occurred because he turned sixty,
something that if proven is considered an illegal act under the ADEA67) or more
generally “being laid off on account of his age.”68 The Court explained that, even if
the illegal employment action caused some psychological injury, the backpay award
was not made “on account of ” that injury; instead, it was made to make the plaintiff
whole for his loss of income.69 Thus, the Court once again made clear that backpay
awards are considered gross income and therefore taxable under the Internal Revenue
Code. In response, Congress codified the Schleier decision by passing the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, which amended § 104(a)(2) to apply only to
“physical injuries.” 70 Because backpay is awarded to compensate an employee for lost
work rather than actual physical injury, the Act precludes any hope for employee
plaintiffs to avoid the taxation of backpay awards, absent Congressional action that
reverses current law.71

62. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
63. Id. at 324–28.
64. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2006).
65.

Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328–29.

66. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
67.

Schleier, 515 U.S. at 324.

68. Id. at 330.
69. Id. at 330–31. In the words of the Court, “§ 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of respondent’s back

wages because the recovery of back wages was not ‘on account of ’ any personal injury and because no
personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered.” Id.

70. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a)–(c), 110 Stat. 1755. Some

scholars view this statutory and judicial line of precedent as the appropriate forum for attacking the
taxation of employment backpay awards. For arguments in this vein, see, for example, John F. Fatino,
The Tax Treatment of Verdicts and Settlements Following the Adoption of the Jobs Creation Act of 2004:
Paradise for Employment Lawyers?, 27 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1 (2006).

71.

An important consequence of this line of cases and legislation is that, because all backpay awards are
taxable, an ITLA must take into account the tax amount the plaintiff would have paid if no illegal act
occurred. Thus, the total tax liability is too great an award. Instead, the award must be calculated by
subtracting the award’s total tax liability from the amount that would have been paid without any illegal
action, resulting in the plaintiff ’s additional tax liability.
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B.	Courts Develop Theories Supporting ITLAs in Response to the Elimination of
Income Averaging

In 1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit became the first circuit
to recognize the availability of an ITLA. In Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co., the court affirmed an ITLA, holding that such awards are within a
trial court’s discretion in determining an equitable remedy under Title VII.72 In this
class action lawsuit, the trial court ordered the defendants to pay seventeen years of
backpay to the plaintiffs and an award to offset the increased tax liability that would
result from its lump-sum payment.73 The court of appeals, in affirming the ITLA,
noted that “the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning remedies to make victims
of discrimination whole,” 74 and held that it was enough to demonstrate that plaintiffs
would “likely” be placed in the highest tax bracket as a result of the award.75 It
reasoned that the particularly long period of litigation created unique problems in
this instance because income averaging provisions only provided for the averaging of
the past three years income,76 and thus would not allow plaintiffs to mitigate their
increased tax liability.77
The Sears court grasped the need for an ITLA before Congress repealed the
Internal Revenue Code’s income averaging provisions. It recognized that it would be
unfair for the aging train-porter plaintiffs in Sears to receive a fraction of their earned
income because their effort to receive that income resulted in protracted litigation.78
Now that the limited relief from income averaging is unavailable, the Sears court’s
analysis is even more persuasive than it was in 1984.79
Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Eshelman v.
Agere Systems, Inc. affirmed an ITLA in an ADA case.80 The court of appeals
explained that the “chief remedial purpose of employment discrimination statutes . . .
is ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
72. 749 F.2d 1451, 1456–57 (10th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 1456.
74.

Id.

75. Id. One can only imagine the difficulties present in determining the tax liability of an entire plaintiff

class over a seventeen-year period.

76. Id. Legislation in 1984 changed the period over which income may be averaged under 26 U.S.C. §

302(c) to three years. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 173(a), 98 Stat. 494, 703 (codified
at I.R.C. § 1302(c)(2)).

77.

Sears, 749 F.2d at 1456.

78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Agere Sys. Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 440 (2009) (“District courts are granted wide

discretion to ‘locate a just result’ regarding the parameters of the relief granted in the circumstances of
each case.” (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931) (citation omitted))).

80. Id. at 430. In the interim, other federal and state courts have upheld ITLAs. See Arneson v. Sullivan,

958 F. Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist.
No. 160, 87 P.3d 757, 763 (Wash. 2004); Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2003).
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discrimination,’”81 and that “Congress armed the courts with broad equitable powers
to effectuate this ‘make whole’ remedy.” 82 Based on that reasoning, it held that a
district court possesses the discretion to make ITLAs on employment discrimination
claims; to hold otherwise would prevent courts from “restor[ing] the employee to the
economic status quo that would exist but for the employer’s conduct,” something that
a make-whole remedy necessitates.83
The court buttressed this holding by analogizing ITLAs to prejudgment interest
awards—awards meant “to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of the use of money
that the plaintiff otherwise would have earned had he not been unjustly discharged.”84
The court reasoned that ITLAs,
as with prejudgment interest, represent[] a recognition that the harm to a
prevailing employee’s pecuniary interest may be broader in scope than just a
loss of back pay. Accordingly, either or both types of equitable relief may be
necessary to achieve complete restoration of the prevailing employee’s
economic status quo and to assure “the most complete relief possible.” 85

The court then considered the supporting evidence for this award, which included
“an affidavit from an economic expert who calculated the amount of tax-effect
damages based upon the back pay award, the applicable tax rates, and Eshelman’s
income tax returns for the appropriate years.”86 The defendant failed to dispute the
accuracy of this evidence.87 The court warned that a plaintiff is not presumptively
entitled to this type of award; plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion and courts
retain their ability to “locate a just result” depending on the circumstances of each
individual case.88 Because the defendant did not dispute the evidence, it is unclear
whether the court would have found for the plaintiff if the defendant challenged, for
instance, the plaintiff ’s projected income or the accuracy of the projected applicable
tax rates.89
81.

Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 440 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, (1975)).

82. Id.
83. Id. at 440–43 (quoting In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 1997)).
84. Id. at 442 (quoting Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Arco Pipeline

Co. v. SS Trade Star, 693 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The purpose of prejudgment interest is to
reimburse the claimant for the loss of the use of its investment of its funds from the time of the loss until
judgment is entered.”).

85. Id. at 442 (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC., 478 U.S. 421, 465 (1986)).
86. Id. at 442.
87.

Id. at 443.

88. Id.
89. Id. Political concerns might factor into this determination, but ultimately should not control a court’s

decision unless an extreme situation presents itself. See infra Part III.C. For example, if an award is
announced by the court in 2012 but not collected until 2013, and the winner of the 2012 presidential
election promises immediate tax hikes as her first act in office, it becomes difficult to estimate a
plaintiff ’s projected tax burden. However, as demonstrated in Part III.C, infra, such fears are overblown
due to the way in which tax policy is normally enacted. In Argue v. David Davis Enterprises, a Third
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Eshelman has received positive treatment in the district courts since it was
decided.90 It provides a clear line of reasoning as to why ITLAs are available to
employment discrimination plaintiffs, one that courts can easily adopt and apply to
other types of employment law claims. Eshelman could—and as this note argues,
should—be applied to any employment claim where (1) the statute provides for broad,
equitable make-whole relief, (2) the statute supports prejudgment interest awards
made to augment backpay awards, and (3) a plaintiff makes an evidentiary showing
that the award is required for her to obtain “a just result.” 91
C.	The Split on ITLAs: Why Negative Increased Tax Liability Precedent Is Outdated
and Unavailing

Courts that refuse to make ITLAs generally point to three reasons for doing so:
(1) the lack of precedent for such awards; (2) the lack of certainty behind the plaintiff ’s
actual increased tax liability due to the potential for change in political and personal
circumstances; and (3) the plaintiff ’s failure to provide accurate calculations to the
court.92
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit articulated the first concern in
Dashnaw v. Pena, where the court denied the plaintiff ’s motion for an ITLA relating
to his ADEA backpay award.93 Basing its decision on the dearth of authority
supporting such an award at the time of decision—the plaintiff did not cite any
precedential support and the court likewise failed to find support—the court ruled
that “[a]bsent an arrangement by voluntary settlement of the parties, the general rule
that victims of discrimination should be made whole does not support ‘gross-ups’ of
backpay to cover tax liability.” 94
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed Dashnaw in Fogg v.
Gonzales, a Title VII case.95 In Fogg, the defendant appealed a lower court ruling
Circuit district court applied Eshelman in an ADEA case and rejected plaintiff ’s claim for an ITLA,
finding the plaintiff ’s calculations insufficient because they: (1) took into account the entire award
rather than only the backpay award alone and (2) calculated plaintiff ’s tax burden using tax bracket
information from 2007 when the trial had taken place in 2008 and the earliest the plaintiff would have
received the lump sum was 2009. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32585, at *76–78 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 2009).
History has demonstrated the Argue court’s fears as overblown; tax brackets remained unchanged from
2007–2010. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 14. Thus, the evidentiary requirement is
something that courts will closely scrutinize in the Third Circuit. See Ellis v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 05-726
(FLW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106620, at *73 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2009) (“However, before assessing the
amount of the award, Plaintiff must provide the Court with additional financial analysis and evidence
with regard to her tax burden for the relevant years in order to avoid speculation.”).
90. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
91.

Eshelman, 544 F.3d at 443.

92.

For an earlier examination of arguments against tax liability awards, see Polsky & Befort, supra note 13,
at 93–98.

93.

12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

94. Id. Notably, the court dispensed with plaintiff ’s arguments using only five sentences. Id.
95. 492 F.3d 447, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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that the plaintiff was entitled to an ITLA based on the protracted nature of the
litigation.96 The lower court ignored Dashnaw and instead cited to Sears for the
proposition that such awards are sometimes available.97 The court of appeals reversed
the lower court, finding Dashnaw controlling.98 Despite important differences
between the two cases that seem to answer and distinguish the qualms of the
Dashnaw court—namely that the plaintiff in Fogg pointed to the Tenth Circuit Sears
decision to support his argument (in contrast to the Dashnaw plaintiff ’s inability to
point to supporting precedent), the Fogg litigation took place over a lengthier time
span, and the Fogg jury awarded a much larger backpay amount than in Dashnaw—
the appellate court held that, because Danshaw was binding precedent, it could not
make an ITLA.99 The court distinguished the plaintiff ’s arguments by pointing out
that the Dashnaw court’s reasoning rested on a lack of applicable precedent rather
than the length of litigation or the size of the award.100 This leads to a curious
situation in the D.C. Circuit. According to Fogg, because the plaintiff in Dashnaw
failed to support his motion for an ITLA with precedent, D.C. Circuit courts cannot
make ITLAs, even in the face of new information and subsequent persuasive
authority. Stare decisis should not cage a court in outdated reasoning;101 perhaps after
Eshelman, the D.C. Circuit will find opportunity to update its case law.
Since the Third Circuit penned the Eshelman decision, concerns over a lack of
precedent for ITLAs should be sufficiently alleviated. The Eshelman court provided
a clear line of reasoning to support ITLAs, one that can easily be adopted by other
circuits.102 For instance, the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas in
Powell v. North Arkansas College adopted the Eshelman decision wholesale when
making an award for the plaintiff ’s increased tax liability.103 In Morgenstern v. County
of Nassau, the District Court for the Northern District of New York declined to
make an ITLA in a § 1983 case; yet in doing so, the court did not preclude the
availability of such awards in the future and specifically stated that “there is precedent
96. Id. at 454–55.
97.

Fogg v. Gonzales, 407 F. Supp. 2d 79, 91 (D.D.C. 2005).

98. Fogg, 492 F.3d at 456.
99. Id. at 455–56.
100. Id. at 456.
101. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (“Thus, we have held in several cases that stare decisis does

not prevent us from overruling a previous decision where there has been a significant change in or
subsequent development of our constitutional law.”); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 394–95 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, ‘[a] substantial
departure from precedent can only be justified . . . in the light of experience with the application of the
rule to be abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environment.’” (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629, 634–35 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added))).

102. Morgenstern v. Cty. of Nassau, No. CV-04-58 (ARL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116602, at *17–18

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009); Powell v. N. Ark. Coll., No. 08-3042, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59826, at
*4–7 (W.D. Ark. July 1, 2009).

103. Powell, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59826, at *7 (“The Court adopts the reasoning of Eshelman, and will

allow the parties to present evidence on this issue at the evidentiary hearing.”).

726

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

for such an award”—a far cry from Dashnaw’s analysis.104 A telling comparison to
Morgenstern can be made with another Second Circuit district court case decided
before Eshelman. In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the court refused to
provide the plaintiff with an ITLA, reasoning in part that “[p]laintiffs rely on the
only case which research reveals has awarded such an adjustment,” and the cited
“case acknowledged that it stood alone . . . [and] has yet to be followed by any other
court.”105 The shift in reasoning between Meacham, which relies mainly on the lack
of precedential support for ITLAs, and Morgenstern, which acknowledged Eshelman
as sufficient precedent and did not view the award as absolutely unavailable under §
1983, demonstrates how Eshelman may—and should—create an erosion of judicial
reliance on Dashnaw and its reasoning.
Eshelman explicitly refuted Dashnaw, and thus implicitly refuted its progeny
(including Fogg) as well.106 Since Eshelman was decided, the D.C. Circuit has not
revisited this issue, nor has any court cited Dashnaw or Fogg favorably on this point.
Based on the foregoing, Eshelman has answered the qualms of the Dashnaw court,
and courts should no longer look to Dashnaw or its progeny as persuasive authority
on this matter.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision in
Argue v. David Davis Enterprises, decided in March 2009, makes an important point
in its analysis that goes to the heart of the second and third reasons why courts
decline to make ITLAs: courts should not make awards based on pure estimation
and should require support by tax calculations, prepared by an expert, that are as
accurate as possible before providing a plaintiff with an ITLA.107 In Argue, plaintiff
submitted calculations to demonstrate that his backpay award would cause an
increased tax liability.108 However, the calculations were based on tax information
from 2007, rather than 2008 (the year the trial occurred) or 2009 (the earliest plaintiff
could have received the award).109 Worse, the plaintiff made estimations that ignored
available tax data, including data already submitted to the court.110 Based on these
inaccuracies in the record, the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden
to demonstrate that his lump-sum award would cause an increased tax liability.
104. Morgenstern, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116602, at *17–18.
105. 185 F. Supp. 2d 193, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). In this case, a jury awarded backpay to a class of eighteen

plaintiffs based on an illegal termination theory under the ADEA. Id. at 203.

106. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 441 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009). Courts that have cited Dashnaw

favorably on this point include: Pollard v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 865, 883
(W.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding that “[s]uch an award would contradict the literature and case law on this
topic” and that the plaintiff ’s calculations were unreliable); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 770, 776
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that plaintiff ’s failure to cite any supporting precedent, coupled with
defendant’s reliance on Danshaw, required the court to refuse plaintiff ’s request for an ITLA).

107. No. 02-9521, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32585 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 2009); see Ben-Zion, supra note 15

(detailing how experts should calculate ITLAs).

108. Argue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32585, at *74.
109. Id. at *74–78.
110. Id.
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The evidentiary requirement makes sense; because of the wide margins between
tax brackets in current U.S. tax law, it is wrong to assume that a plaintiff requires an
ITLA to be made whole.111 Thus, the Argue court was correct to require better, more
up-to-date information. Yet, courts should not balk at all uncertainties in tax burden
calculations and projections. A court should not expect or require a plaintiff to
demonstrate her tax liability with absolute certainty for a tax year that has not yet
ended. Instead, the court should require only that the plaintiff provide the most
up-to-date tax information reasonably available. Such a demonstration might include
evidence of receiving the same salary over a period of years to support the use of that
salary level as “projected income” when determining a plaintiff ’s tax liability for a
year not yet completed.
Also, courts should not hesitate to apply current tax bracket information to an
award to be received in the following year. The Argue court suggested that political
considerations could make the application of current tax bracket information in
calculations of future tax burdens problematic.112 However, the percentages that the
federal government uses to tax individuals are not altered casually; they are normally
adjusted only after public debate and legislation.113 Additionally, tax rates do not
normally change the day after a bill is passed and signed into law; there will almost
always be an adjustment period before the law becomes enforceable, giving courts
and plaintiffs advance notice that calculations using current tax bracket information
could be incorrect.114 Thus, courts should accept calculations even though they are
based on future estimations of tax liability, so long as they are based on the most
up-to-date, reasonably available information.
While it is important to ensure plaintiffs do not receive a windfall, it is also
significant that the defendant’s illegal actions produced the plaintiff ’s increased tax
liability. The consequences of uncertainty in tax rates should fall on the party that
broke the law: the employer.115 In narrow cases, or in cases where a court’s analysis
111. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 14 (Bracket 1: $0–$8,375; Bracket 2: over $8,375–$34,000;

Bracket 3: over $34,000–$82,400; Bracket 4: over $82,400–$171,850; Bracket 5: over $171,850–
$373,650; Bracket 6: over $373,650).

112. Argue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32585, at *77 (“Of course, it is now 2009 and, to say the least, the

question of federal income tax rates is in its own state of flux and speculation.”).

113. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (codified in scattered sections of 26

U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The end of 2010 is a unique example where this was not the case.
Because the Bush tax cuts were passed with an expiration date rather than as a permanent change in tax
policy, a shift in tax policy would have occurred in 2011 if no legislative action was taken. Because in
this situation a change to tax burdens would occur through passive action by Congress, rather than the
normal requirement of active legislation, courts must be wary in making these awards in 2010. A
plaintiff might overcome this unfortunate political situation by demonstrating her tax liability under
both the current regime and the one that would occur if the Bush tax cuts expired in toto.

114. See supra note 112.
115. See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Goss v. Exxon

Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984)); Loesch v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-cv-0578,
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must draw on estimations of future events, deference should be granted to the
plaintiff, the victim of the employer’s illegal actions, and uncertainty should weigh
against the illegal actor.116 The Sears decision supports this deferential analysis; it
described a plaintiff ’s burden in demonstrating an increased tax liability as requiring
a showing that “[t]he court-ordered back pay awards will likely place the living
members of the class in the highest income tax bracket on much of the back pay they
now receive.”117 Because the Sears litigation involved a large class of plaintiffs, the
court did not require individuals to demonstrate their increased tax liability on an
individualized basis; the court instead rested on the general economic circumstances
of the plaintiffs.118 A similar deference should be granted to plaintiffs in individual
employment cases.119 It should be noted that such deference does not cut against
Eshelman’s warning that courts should not presume the applicability of ITLAs in
every case120 —it merely supplements that command by cautioning against overstringent examination in cases where a plaintiff has provided the best evidence that
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48757 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2008) (“Since it has been already determined that the
wages in question were lost as a result of Defendant’s unlawful actions, the Defendant ‘is not entitled to
complain that [the damages] cannot be measure with the exactness and precision that would be possible
if the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.’” (quoting Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931))).
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
117. Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. See generally J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 567 (1981) (“The vagaries of

the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff ’s situation would have been in the
absence of the defendant’s . . . violation. But our willingness also rests on the principle . . . that it does
not ‘come with very good grace’ for the wrongdoer to insist upon specific and certain proof of the injury
which it has itself inflicted.” (quoting Hetzel v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 169 U.S. 26, 39 (1898)); Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (“Where the tort itself is of
such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts”); Samaritan Inns v. Dist. of Columbia, 114
F.3d 1227 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[W]hile a plaintiff seeking to recover lost profits must ordinarily prove the
fact of injury with reasonable certainty, proof of the amount of damages may be based on a reasonable
estimate. Although a court will not permit a plaintiff to recover damages based on ‘mere speculation or
guess,’ the fact that an estimate is uncertain or inexact will not defeat recovery, once the fact of injury is
shown.” (citations omitted) (quoting Wood v. Day, 859 F.2d 1490, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1988))); Restatement
(Second) of Torts, cmt. A (1979) (“There is, however, no general requirement that the injured person
should prove with like definiteness the extent of harm that he has suffered as a result of the tortfeasor’s
conduct. It is desirable that responsibility for harm should not be imposed until it has been proved with
reasonable certainty that the harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the person charged. It is
desirable, also, that there be definiteness of proof of the amount of damage as far as is reasonably
possible. It is even more desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived of substantial compensation
merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered. Particularly is this
true in situations where there cannot be any real equivalence between the harm and compensation in
money, as in case of emotional disturbance, or where the harm is of such a nature as necessarily to prevent
anything approximating accuracy of proof, as when anticipated profits of a business have been prevented.”
(emphasis added)).

120. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009).

729

INCREASED TAX LIABILITY AWARDS AFTER ESHELMAN

could be reasonably obtained. This comports with the Argue court’s main contention
as well—that the plaintiff did not use the most up-to-date information reasonably
available (namely, already completed tax returns) to make the necessary calculations
for the award.121
As the Eshelman opinion notes, it is helpful to analogize the long-accepted award
for prejudgment interest.122 Prejudgment interest is a make-whole award123 meant “to
reimburse the claimant for the loss of the use of its investment or its funds from the
time of the loss until judgment is entered.”124 Yet these awards are premised on an
assumption: the plaintiff would have made successful investments if she had received
her wages or benefits in a timely manner.125 If one views the success of 401(k)
accounts as indicative of the investing ability of most employees, this assumption is
far from a safe one.126 As stated by the Third Circuit, “[t]he risk of lack of certainty
with respect to projections of lost income must be borne by the wrongdoer, not the
victim.”127 Applying this maxim, the possibility that a plaintiff might not be made
whole for an employer’s illegal action without an ITLA is a sufficient basis for courts
to make such awards, so long as the plaintiff provides fact-based, evidentiary support
for that possibility; because employers should bear the risk of uncertainties outside of
the plaintiff ’s direct control, courts should treat a plaintiff ’s tax calculations, and any
projections used in them, with a lenient standard.128
121. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
122. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 442.
123. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 462 (2010).
124. Arco Pipeline Co. v. SS Trade Star, 693 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1982).
125. The award could also be viewed as receipt of monies accumulated by the employer through use of the

withheld wages. This viewpoint leads to an equally poignant assumption: that the employer did in fact
invest those amounts wisely.

126. See, e.g., Ross Eisenbrey, Vice-President, Econ. Pol’y Inst., Address to the National Press Club: Why

We Need Retirement USA (March 10, 2009), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/why_
we_need_retirement_usa/; Eirik Cheverud, Reforming the U.S. Retirement System in the Wake of the Great
Recession (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914892.
It may be true that prejudgment interest awards require courts to accept greater uncertainties than
awards of ITLAs. Courts do not require plaintiffs to demonstrate prior prudent investment decisions
when determining an appropriate interest rate for prejudgment interest. Because plaintiffs must provide
some evidentiary support for their projected tax burden, a court has better reason to believe that the
lifelong trend of an employee’s remuneration and taxation will continue on stable course than a plaintiff ’s
investment of wages and benefits would return at ten percent (while this number is a hypothetical one,
it is within the average range for such awards). Thus, as in instances of prejudgment interest awards,
courts should not require complete certainty and accuracy in calculations of a plaintiff ’s tax burden.

127. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984).
128. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (“Where the tort

itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and
thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may
not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is
not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if
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In sum, courts should treat plaintiffs’ tax calculations and the projections on
which they are based with deference; it should be sufficient that the plaintiff make a
reasonable effort to provide the court with up-to-date information and calculations
that reflect actual tax liability.129 The possibility of error in calculations that meet
this standard should constitute part of the risk taken by the employer when it violates
state and federal employment law.130
D.	Seventh Amendment Concerns Regarding ITLAs Do Not Withstand Scrutiny
When Viewed in Light of Prejudgment Interest Precedent

In an outlier case, Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico held that an ITLA would violate the Seventh Amendment
as a form of unconstitutional additur when made by a court to increase a jury’s
verdict.131 While in this instance the plaintiff did not offer a “deal” as compared to
the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise. As the Supreme Court of Michigan has
forcefully declared, the risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of upon
the injured party.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also cases and secondary source cited supra
note 118.
129. This requirement is purely technical; the calculations should focus on a plaintiff ’s additional tax liability.

For guidance, see Ben-Zion, supra note 15, providing a detailed account of calculating actual tax
liability.

130. Indeed, common practice in settlement agreements tends to show an acceptance of this fact by employers.

ITLAs are a common element of settlement agreements in employment cases. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone
Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“[A] district court, in the exercise of its
discretion, may include a tax component in a lump sum back pay award to compensate prevailing Title
VII plaintiffs. This accords with a prevailing practice in the settlement of Title VII suits which
commonly include an amount to offset the plaintiff/taxpayer’s increased liability.” (citation omitted)).
Their acceptance in settlement negotiations by employers lends to the argument that ITLAs are a
necessary and fair component to making the plaintiff whole for unlawful employment actions.

131. No. CIV 03-507 JB/ACT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28785 (D.N.M. March 31, 2006). Additur is defined

as “[a] trial court’s order, issued [usually] with the defendant’s consent, that increases the damages
awarded by the jury to avoid a new trial on grounds of inadequate damages. The term may also refer to
the increase itself, the procedure, or the court’s power to make the order.” Id. at *7 (citing Black’s Law
Dictionary 15 (3d Pocket Ed., 2006)). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Dimick v. Schiedt that the
practice of additur by federal courts violated the Seventh Amendment right to a trial and verdict by jury.
293 U.S. 474 (1935). Such motions should not be confused with the similar motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. See Irene Deaville Sann, Remitturs (and Additurs) in Federal Courts: An
Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 157, 157–64 (1987–88) (“The motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is based on the losing party’s contention that no ‘reasonable
jury’ could have found for the verdict winner on the strength of the evidence adduced at trial; thus, as a
matter of law, the verdict should be reversed through entry of a judgment favorable to the original loser.
Grounds for the new trial motion might include . . . excessiveness of the jury verdict. . . . If the trial
judge agrees that the jury verdict is excessive, he may order a whole new trial or a partial new trial
limited to damage assessment issues. Trial judges also utilize an alternative method for dealing with
some excessive verdicts—the trial judge calculates the amount of the verdict which he regards as
excessive and then orders a conditional new trial (on some or all issues), to be held if the plaintiff refuses
to give up (remit) the amount of the jury verdict deemed by the trial judge to be excessive. This
procedural device is called a remittitur. If the plaintiff refuses to remit, the case is submitted to a new
jury without further action by the trial court. . . . This conditional new trial device—remittitur—has
been employed by state as well as federal trial courts (and, in some circumstances, appellate courts) for
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more traditional instances of additur (e.g., an additional award instead of a motion
for a new trial on the grounds of inadequate damages), the court explained that
Tenth Circuit precedent does not require a court-ordered award increase be
accompanied by a motion for a new trial in order for the additional award to violate
the Seventh Amendment; instead, a court’s “bald addition” to the award would, in
itself, constitute impermissible additur.132
The court reinforced its constitutional argument by finding in the alternative
that the plaintiff ’s motion did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”), the rule that allows parties to make a “motion to alter
or amend a judgment.”133 In the Tenth Circuit, Rule 59(e) motions will not be granted
except “to correct manifest errors of law, to present newly discovered evidence, or to
contest inconsistencies in a jury’s verdict.”134 The Kelley court held that none of these
three situations applied to the facts at bar.135
While intriguing, the Kelley court’s constitutional argument is simply wrong.
Because Kelley is the only case to challenge the constitutionality of court-imposed
ITLAs made as an alteration of a jury verdict, it is instructive to view the
constitutionality of analogous prejudgment interest awards in this context. In
Osternick v. Ernst & Whinney, the Supreme Court made clear that additional judgemade awards for prejudgment interest are a permissible court-mandated alteration of
a jury verdict by placing such awards under the rubric of Rule 59(e), thereby
eliminating any room for a Seventh Amendment attack.136 The Court reasoned that
a post-trial prejudgment interest award is properly viewed as permissible under Rule
59(e) because “prejudgment interest ‘is an element of [plaintiff ’s] complete
compensation’” and does not “‘rais[e] issues wholly collateral to the judgment in the

more than one hundred years, and the use of remittitur has increased continuously to the present day.
While the related conditional new trial device of additur—grant of plaintiff ’s motion for a new trial
conditioned on the defendant’s refusal to increase the jury verdict by the amount the trial judge deems
necessary to cure an inadequate verdict—is employed by some state courts, federal courts are prohibited
from using additur because the Supreme Court has ruled that the procedure violates the seventh
amendment of the Constitution.”).
132. Kelley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28785, at *8–9.
133. Id. at 19–21; Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
134. Kelley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28785, at *20.
135. Id.
136. 489 U.S. at 175 (1989); see also Webco Indus. v. Thermatool Corp., 278 F.3d 1120, 1134 (10th Cir.

2002) (“We are likewise not persuaded by Thermatool’s contention that if the award of prejudgment
interest is a substantive matter, it would constitute an impermissible additur to include it subsequent to
the jury’s award of damages. Thermatool appears to assert that prejudgment interest in a diversity case
must be presented to the jury and cannot be the subject of a post-trial motion. The law, however, is to
the contrary. As the Supreme Court made clear in a case involving a jury, ‘a postjudgment motion for
discretionary prejudgment interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59(e).’ These cases and those to which they cite leave no room for the argument that granting such a
motion would result in impermissible additur.” (citations omitted) (quoting Osternick, 489 U.S. at 175).
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main cause of action,’ nor does it require an inquiry wholly ‘separate from the decision
on the merits.’”137
The Osternick case is easily applied to ITLAs. The tax award is clearly part of a
plaintiff ’s “complete compensation” because without it, a plaintiff would effectively
receive less compensation than if no illegal act had occurred.138 The issues raised by a
motion for such an award are not beyond the plaintiff ’s cause of action; the requested
damages flow directly from the facts and judgment of the case. As such, courts should
treat ITLAs under the same analysis of prejudgment interest awards and, pursuant to
Osternick, should be considered permissible under the Seventh Amendment.
Because ITLAs meet the requirements of Rule 59(e) as applied in Osternick, the
Kelley court also erred by holding that Rule 59(e) did not support such awards. As
noted above, the Tenth Circuit requires, in addition to the requirements of Osternick,
that a court should only grant a Rule 59(e) motion “to correct manifest errors of law,
to present newly discovered evidence, or to contest inconsistencies in a jury’s
verdict.”139 According to the Tenth Circuit in Macsenti v. Becker, an award of
prejudgment interest is meant to correct a manifest error of law “because prejudgment
interest is considered part of the plaintiff ’s compensation and is thus part of the
merits of the trial court’s judgment,” bringing the award squarely within Rule 59(e).140
The Kelley court acknowledged as much in its ruling on a separate plaintiff motion
for prejudgment interest.141 The failure to include an award to offset a plaintiff ’s
increased tax liability also represents a manifest error of law because it is properly
“considered part of the plaintiff ’s compensation and is thus part of the merits of the
trial court’s judgment,” based on the fact that plaintiffs with increased tax burdens
will not receive their full, duly earned compensation without an ITLA.142
IV.	Courts should Expand ITLAs Beyond the Anti-Discrimination
Context to All Employment Awards

This section intends to provide plaintiffs and courts with precedential support
for the expansion of ITLAs beyond the employment discrimination context. The
Eshelman decision provided excellent reasoning for why this type of award is within
a trial court’s discretion, but qualified its analysis as applying only to “discrimination
137. Osternick, 489 U.S. at 175 (quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310, & n.2 (1987)).
138. Id. This idea cuts to the heart of the arguments surrounding ITLAs: When do we measure the plaintiff ’s

remedy? When it departs the hands of the employer or when it is received by the hands of the plaintiff?
By the very nature of a “make-whole” remedy, the answer must be the latter. The heart of the concern in
backpay cases is with placing the plaintiff in a situation mirroring what would have occurred without
any illegal activity, as opposed to the mere extraction of withheld compensation.

139. Kelley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28785, at *20.
140. 237 F.3d 1223, 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); see Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., 431 F.3d 1268,

1274–75 (10th Cir. 2005); Capstick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 810, 812–13 (10th Cir. 1993).

141. Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV-03-507 JB/ACT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28782, at *3–6

(D.N.M. April 12, 2006).

142. Id. at *4.
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cases.” 143 Other scholarship on this issue has also cabined itself to the antidiscrimination context.144 As explained in Part III.C, the Morgenstern court discussed
ITLAs in a § 1983 case, a civil rights statute often used in the employment context
that provides a cause of action against those who deprive someone of their
constitutional rights under the color of the law—a claim distinct, albeit in many
ways similar, from those under anti-discrimination statutes.145 This part will
demonstrate that by using the criteria of Eshelman—statutory authority for equitable
remedies and analogies to prejudgment interest awards146 —ITLAs should be available
in a wide variety of employment claims. To demonstrate this point, this Part focuses
on five federal statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fair Labor Standards
Act; the National Labor Relations Act; and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.
A. Civil Rights Claims under Sections 1981 and 1983

Employees can enforce workplace rights through claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983 against an offending employer, two causes of action that include broad

143. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 442–43 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Having determined that a district

court may award a prevailing employee an additional sum of money to compensate for the increased tax
burden a back pay award may create . . . [w]e hasten to add that . . . we do not suggest that a prevailing
plaintiff in discrimination cases is presumptively entitled to an additional award to offset tax
consequences above the amount to which she would otherwise be entitled.”).

144. See Polsky & Befort, supra note 13 (entire article, with the exception of one footnote, note 259); Canney,

supra note 60; Geoffrey D. Mueller, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of States’ Laws Against
Discrimination: Why Blaney Was Right and Why New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination Should Be
Amended, 29 Seton Hall Legis. J. 603 (2005) (discussing the applicability of ITLAs under New Jersey
State discrimination laws); Laura Spitz, I Think, Therefore I Am; I Feel, Therefore I Am Taxed: Descartes,
Tort Reform, and the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 N.M. L. Rev. 429 (2005); J. Hardin Marion, Legal
and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 Md. L. Rev. 298 (1986). But
see Ben-Zion, supra note 15 (contemplating the use of ITLAs in all employment claims when examining
mathematical and economic aspects of the award).

145. See generally Douglas S. Miller, Off Duty, Off the Wall, But Not Off the Hook: Section 1983 Liability for the

Private Misconduct of Public Officials, 30 Akron L. Rev. 325 (1997) (examining various models used to
determine what actions are considered to be under the color of state law for section 1983 analysis).

146. When presenting this paper to a group of practitioners and colleagues at New York Law School, one

audience member seized upon a seemingly important distinction between ITLAs and prejudgment
interest awards. If not awarded to a plaintiff, the former benefits a third party, namely the federal
government (and potentially applicable state and municipal governments as well), while the latter
benefits the employer. Thus, while it makes sense to charge an employer for the benefit of using withheld
wages, it would seem unfair to require an employer to pay for the actions that are beyond its control,
such as the extraction of taxes. However, this argument sides too heavily with the illegal actor. As
demonstrated in Part III.C, an illegal actor must be charged not just with the amount withheld, but for
all of the effects of its actions; this result is necessitated by the make-whole remedy included in
employment statutes. Under that theory, it does not matter who receives the benefit of the employee’s
loss; it only requires that the employer place the plaintiff in a situation mirroring that which would have
occurred without any illegal act.
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equitable remedies and support prejudgment interest remedies.147 Sovereign immunity,
a defense most pertinent to § 1983 claims (which are mainly brought against
government actors) but applicable as a general rule as well, will prevent any ITLA
against the federal government unless the applicable statute contains a Congressional
waiver.148 However, state governments do not enjoy similar protection, and are thus
vulnerable to ITLAs.149
		

1. Section 1983

The Morgenstern decision discussed in Part III.C, in which a Second Circuit
district court declined to make an ITLA, characterized whether front pay is available
under § 1983 in the following way: “In determining whether an award of front pay is
appropriate, ‘the court must attempt to make the plaintiff whole, while avoiding
granting plaintiff a windfall.’”150 In Simon v. City of Youngstown, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that “[i]n order to receive damages under
Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principles of common law torts are ordinarily
used. Back-pay awards are usually the make-whole remedy used to redress any
economic harm suffered.”151 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) (“(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the

United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)
(“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”); see David W. Lee, 2009 Handbook of Section 1983
Litigation (2009); Susan Potter Norton, Employment Litigation 38 (2004).

148. Arneson v. Callahan, 128 F.3d 1243, 1246 (8th Cir. 1997).
149. States will not find cover under the cloak of sovereign immunity; claims of Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity are superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Powell v. N. Ark. Coll., No.
08-3042, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59826, at *4–7 (W.D. Ark. July 1, 2009).

150. Morgenstern v. Cty. of Nassau, No. CV 04-58 (ARL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116602, at *14–15

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (quoting Wylucki v. Barberio, No. 99-CV-1036Sr, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21134, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2001)).

151. 73 F.3d 68, 74 (6th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1995) (“This action

arises under § 1983, whose purpose . . . is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence
fails. In 1871, in fashioning § 1983—as, in 1991, it was to do in revising (with a view to strengthening)
Title VII—Congress authorized courts to deploy both legal and equitable remedies. Under Title VII,
the statute’s make-whole purpose is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts
with full equitable powers. The same is true under § 1983: the make-whole goal does not differ when
the basis of the underlying right is the Constitution rather than a statute such as Title VII. Because of
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Circuit in Gierlinger v. Gleason, “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include
pre-judgment interest” on backpay claims under § 1983, demonstrating a strong
presumption in favor of prejudgment interest awards in this context.152 Based on
these well-founded principles—that § 1983 awards are subject to the same makewhole remedies of Title VII and support prejudgment interest awards—courts should
apply Eshelman in instances where backpay is provided to a plaintiff under § 1983.
		

2. Section 1981

Section 1981 supplies plaintiffs with a cause of action in certain situations of
intentional discrimination, one of which involves rights arising from a contractual
relationship. Thus, it sometimes provides a cause of action in the employment context,
including claims for backpay.153 In Barbour v. Merrill, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit “evaluate[d] Barbour’s claims in light of the principle that under
section 1981, as under Title VII, a district court has wide discretion to award equitable
relief. The district court should fashion this relief so as to provide a victim of
employment discrimination the most complete make-whole relief possible.”154 The
court went on to hold that, based on this reasoning, § 1981 supports prejudgment
interest awards for backpay claims.155 In an effort to provide the “most complete” relief
possible, courts should adopt Eshelman in their § 1981 analysis as well. Barbour
analogized Title VII awards to § 1981 awards, something that lends to an adoption of
Eshelman’s ruling. Because a plaintiff does not receive complete, make-whole relief
when forced to pay more taxes than if her civil rights had not been violated, ITLAs
are essential when § 1981 backpay awards create an additional tax burden.
Thus, because both § 1981 and § 1983 provide make-whole remedies and support
prejudgment interest awards, courts should adopt Eshelman when analyzing available
damages in employment cases under §§ 1981 and 1983.
B. Fair Labor Standards Act

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)156 includes a grant of broad equitable
powers through FLSA §§ 16(b) and 17.157 The first provides a remedy for retaliatory
this consonance of the underlying policy considerations, the framework of analysis governing
reinstatement in Title VII actions also governs in § 1983 actions implicating First Amendment concerns;
that is, a denial of reinstatement is unwarranted unless grounded in a rationale which is harmonious
with the legislative goals of providing plaintiffs make-whole relief and deterring employers from
unconstitutional conduct.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)); Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
626 F.2d 1115, 1121 (3d Cir. 1980).
152. 160 F.3d 858, 873–74 (2d Cir. 1998).
153. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. 48 F.3d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
155. Id.
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219d (2006).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of section [215(a)(3) of this title]

shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section
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acts taken by an employer as a result of an employee’s attempt to enforce her FLSA
rights; the second provides an employee with a remedy for violations of maximumhour and minimum-wage regulations. Both support prejudgment interest awards as
well (although § 16(b) limits prejudgment interest awards to instances where
liquidated damages are not awarded alongside a backpay award), thus meeting the
two Eshelman requirements needed to support ITLAs.
		

1. Section 17

In Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained that FLSA § 17 provides courts with “broad equitable powers” in
fashioning FLSA remedies:
The purposes of a restitutionary injunction under section 17 are to make
whole employees who have unlawfully been deprived of wages and to eliminate
the competitive advantage enjoyed by employers who have illegally underpaid
their workers. In addition to enjoining future violations of the Act, relief will
ordinarily include a damage award consisting of reimbursement for loss of
wages, and prejudgment interest, as well as reinstatement of the discharged
employee under appropriate circumstances.158

Other courts have held similarly.159 Thus, the broad equitable powers granted to courts
under § 17, when coupled with the presumption in favor of awarding prejudgment
interest to backpay recipients, support ITLAs for FLSA retaliation claims.160
[215(a)(3) of this title], including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the
payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (2006)
(“The district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone,
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the District Court of Guam shall have jurisdiction, for
cause shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this title, including in the case of violations of
section 215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime
compensation found by the court to be due to employees under this chapter.”).
158. 839 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
159. See, e.g., Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (“[T]he comprehensiveness of this

equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the
court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. The
great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction.” (citations omitted)); Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984);
Donovan v. Brown Equip. & Serv. Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1982); Hodgson v. Am. Can Co.,
440 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1971).

160. These arguments find equal force under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which applies to instances of retaliation

under FLSA (with the exceptions noted in note 165 regarding liquidated damages). See, e.g., Shea v.
Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding prejudgment interest award
under §216(b)); Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537 (affirming award of prejudgment interest under § 216(b));
Caldman v. California, 852 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (providing prejudgment interest under §
216(b)). But see Peters v. Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1168–69 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that while
Fifth Circuit precedent inexplicably makes a distinction between §§ 216 and 217—that prejudgment
interest is available under § 217 but not § 216—and is alone in that distinction, it is bound by precedent
to enforce its case law).
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2. Section 16(b)

In Pignataro v. Port Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained the policy behind providing prejudgment interest on § 16(b) claims,
stating,
[I]n the absence of an explicit congressional directive, the awarding of
prejudgment interest under federal law is committed to the trial court’s
discretion” and should be awarded based on considerations of fairness. . . .
Prejudgment interest attempts to compensate for the delay in receiving the
wages as well as offset the reduction in the value of the delayed payments
caused by inflation.161

In the same way, ITLAs provide plaintiffs with the most “fair” compensation in that
without such an award, a plaintiff is unduly deprived of her earned compensation
because of a separate actor’s illegal conduct. Just as prejudgment interest accounts for
changed circumstances due to inf lation, ITLAs also address the plaintiff ’s
circumstances as altered by employer’s illegal action, i.e., by minimizing the plaintiff ’s
increased tax burden. Courts have regularly viewed § 16(b) as providing a makewhole remedy, thus meeting the Eshelman standard for supporting ITLAs.162
Yet a difficulty arises when liquidated damages are also awarded pursuant to §
16(b), which allows a court to provide a plaintiff with liquidated damages equal to
the amount of unpaid wages owed.163 Such an award is mandatory unless the court
finds that the employer acted in good faith and reasonably believed its conduct was
legal.164 In those instances, the court may award liquidated damages at its discretion.
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, the Supreme Court explained that
Section 16(b) authorizes the recovery of liquidated damages as compensation
for delay in payment of sums due under the Act. Since Congress has seen fit
to fix the sums recoverable for delay, it is inconsistent with Congressional
intent to grant recovery of interest on such sums in view of the fact that
interest is customarily allowed as compensation for delay in payment.165

The Court continued, stating that “[a]llowance of interest on minimum wages and
liquidated damages recoverable under Section 16(b) tends to produce the undesirable
result of allowing interest on interest. . . . Congress, by enumerating the sums
recoverable in an action under § 16(b), meant to preclude recovery of interest on
minimum wages and liquidated damages.”166

161. 593 F.3d 265, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 1987)).
162. See, e.g., Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 2000).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
164. Id. § 260.
165. 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945).
166. Id. at 715–16.
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While circuits courts remain split as to whether Brooklyn Savings applies to the
ADEA,167 a statute that incorporates the FLSA’s damages provisions, courts have
not read that ambiguity into the essential Brooklyn Savings holding. Thus, when a
plaintiff receives an award under § 16(b) that includes liquidated damages, she may
not receive an additional award for prejudgment interest.
Yet this precedent does not put the possibility of an ITLA under § 16(b) to rest.
If the Supreme Court’s explanation in Brooklyn Savings of liquidated damages is
limited to compensation for the time-value of money, the Court limited the purpose
of liquidated damages so much as to exclude ITLAs. When this limitation is coupled
with the more general make-whole remedy intended by § 16(b), an argument exists
that the specific replacement of prejudgment interest awards with liquidated damages
does not preclude other equitable, make-whole remedies. As such, Brooklyn Savings
might be distinguished by limiting the liquidated damages provision of § 16(b) to
providing for prejudgment interest only, thus paving the way for ITLAs on § 16(b)
claims—even when prejudgment interest is barred by a liquidated damages award.
Yet this argument is by no means a certain win; Brooklyn Savings described § 16(b)’s
“liquidated damages as compensation for delay in payment of sums due under the
Act.” Because a plaintiff ’s increased tax liability is at base cause by the delay of wage
payment, a court might just as easily find ITLAs are not appropriate when a plaintiff
is awarded liquidated damages under § 16(b).
C. The National Labor Relations Act

While the NLRA could be considered the first federal anti-discrimination statute
(for instance, it provides for retaliation claims based upon engagement in union
activity), it is generally treated differently than other anti-discrimination statutes due
to its unique administrative structure and distinct line of Board-developed precedent.168
However, because Title VII modeled its damages provisions after those in the NLRA,
the application of Eshelman’s reasoning is relatively simple.169
167. As noted in Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., there is currently a circuit split as to whether prejudgment

interest is available when a court provides liquidated damages under the ADEA. 176 F.3d 399, 406 (7th
Cir. 1999); see Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982). The First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits hold that prejudgment interest is not available when
a court provides liquidated damages; the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits provide
prejudgment interest without concern to the presence of liquidated damages. See Uphoff, 176 F.3d. at
406; Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995).

168. See William D. Turner, Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining: Prohibiting Discrimination Against

Economic Strikers, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 685 (1994) (“Workplace fairness reform also will bring the NLRA
into line with all other federal and state anti-discrimination statutes, as well as a substantial body of
caselaw establishing exceptions for individual employees in many states to employment at will. . . . No
principled basis exists for differentiating the rights of economic strikers from those enjoyed by employees
under other anti-discrimination statutes and judicially-created exceptions to employment at will.
Discrimination is discrimination, and the NLRA should be elevated to a status of equal dignity with
other statutes and common law doctrines.”)

169. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1964) (“The ‘make whole’ purpose of Title VII is made

evident by the legislative history. The backpay provision was expressly modeled on the backpay provision
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In 2000, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) Office of
General Counsel issued a policy memorandum directing all NLRB regional directors,
officers-in-charge, and resident officers to “seek a ‘tax component’ to a backpay award
obligating respondents to reimburse discriminatees for extra federal and state income
taxes that would result from a lump-sum backpay award.”170 Prior Board decisions
did not apply such remedies because of income averaging provisions present in the
Internal Revenue Code.171 However, the memorandum noted that such provisions no
longer existed, rendering the reasoning in those decisions moot.172 It then explained
that the Board had the authority to make such awards under § 10(c) of the NLRA:
The Board’s authority to reinstate the status quo ante derives from its broad
Congressional mandate under Section 10(c) of the Act to determine the
proper scope of its remedial orders, particularly with respect to affirmative
relief. . . . [B]y its plain meaning, Section 10(c) is a grant of authority to the
Board to devise remedies for various unfair labor practices, so long as such
remedies “effectuate the policies of the Act.”173

This memorandum was signed by then-General Counsel Leonard R. Page, a unionside labor lawyer who was appointed by a Democratic president.174 Within seven
months of the memorandum’s publication, Page stepped down and a Republican
nominee took his place as General Counsel.175 It can be inferred that the change in
leadership resulted in a change in priorities; no such awards were made after April
2001.176
In Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 26 (“Local
26”), the Board declined to reach the argument for an ITLA in an adjudicative action
of the National Labor Relations Act. Under that Act, ‘[m]aking the workers whole for losses suffered on
account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which the Board
enforces.’ . . . [G]iven a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate [Title VII’s] central statutory purposes.” (quoting
quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941)).
170. National Labor Relations Board, General Counsel Memorandum, Reimbursement for Excess Federal and

State Income Taxes which Discriminatees Owe as a Result of Receiving a Lump-sum Backpay Award, 2000
NLRB GCM LEXIS 70, at *9 (Sept. 22, 2000) [hereinafter NLRB Memorandum].

171. See Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 438 (1985), enforced 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985); Laborers

Int’l Union Local 282 (Austin Co.), 271 N.L.R.B. 878 (1984).

172. See NLRB Memorandum, supra note 168, at *3.
173. Id. at *4–5.
174. General Counsels Since 1935, National Labor Relations Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/

general-counsel/general-counsels-1935 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Union Lawyer to Take Over at NLRB,
Braun Consulting Group, http://www.braunconsulting.com/bcg/nlrbnom.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2011).

175. See General Counsels Since 1935, supra note 173.
176. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/

topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_labor_relations_board/index.html?8qa&scp=1spot&sq=NLRB+&st=nyt.
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because neither the general counsel nor the charging party sought the remedy.177
Member Liebman, in dissent, explained that the General Counsel originally sought
such a remedy, only to later withdraw the request.178 She argued that the Board
should not have granted the withdrawal request because the General Counsel did not
adequately explain its reasons for doing so; and pointed out that the Board may
consider damages sua sponte.179 In support of ITLAs, Liebman explained:
A make-whole remedy for victims of unlawful discrimination should place
the employee in the same position she would have been in had the unlawful
discrimination not occurred. “The underlying policy of Section 10(c) of the
[National Labor Relations] Act . . . is ‘a restoration of the situation, as nearly
as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal
discrimination.’” Tax compensation is therefore both an appropriate and
necessary method for making whole victims of unlawful discrimination.180

She continued, stating that given the notorious “weakness of the Board’s remedies,”
such an award was necessary in order to further the NLRA’s “effectiveness in
protecting employees who exercise their rights.”181
Thus, there exist strong arguments that the Board does hold the power to make
ITLAs under § 10(c) of the Act; however, the Board has avoided seeking this remedy
since announcing its availability in 2000. Recent changes in Board membership have
likely provided Liebman with a majority on this issue, increasing the likelihood that
the Board will begin making this award in the near future.182

177. 344 N.L.R.B. 567, 567 (2005).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 568 (citations omitted) (quoting Trustees of Boston Univ., 224 N.L.R.B. 1385 (1976), enforced 548

F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1977)).

181. Id. at 568.
182. Indeed, the new general counsel appointed by President Obama recently wrote a new memorandum

renewing the call for the inclusion of ITLAs in cases brought by the General Counsel’s office. See
Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident
Officers, Changes in the Methods Used to Calculate Backpay in Light of Kentucky River Medical Center and
to Better Effectuate the Remedial Purposes of the Act, GC 11-08 (March 11, 2011), ), http://www.
laborrelationstoday.com/uploads/file/GC_11-08_Changes_to_the_Methods_Used_to_Calculate_
Backpay_doc[1].pdf (“Regions should seek a tax component in all future cases to reimburse discriminatees
for the excess federal and state income taxes owed as a result of receiving a lump-sum backpay award
covering more than one year of backpay. Therefore, Regions should plead the following remedy
requesting this tax component in all future complaints in cases where a monetary award is available. ”
(footnote omitted)); see also Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock Is Ending on the Labor Board, N.Y. Times,
April 1, 2010, at B1 (“Because of President Obama’s recess appointments of two union lawyers to the
National Labor Relations Board, business groups are warning that the panel will kick quickly into a
pro-union gear after 26 months of near paralysis, when just two of its five seats were filled.”).
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D. Employee Retirement Income Security Act

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)183 claims present unique
situations because of the statute’s internal complexity, its well-defined scope of
remedies, and the variety of claims and awards that it supports. A close examination
of ERISA case law reveals that § 503(a)(3), the provision providing “other equitable
relief ” for violations of the statute, precludes ITLAs in many cases, including claims
of discrimination and retaliation under ERISA § 510.184 However, courts might still
make ITLAs under § 502(a)(1)(B) when a court orders a plan to pay funds owed to a
participant.
In Variety Corp. v. Howe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a plan
administrator or employer violates its fiduciary duties to an ERISA plan, broad
equitable remedies are available to plan participants under ERISA § 502(a)(3).185 The
Court explained that § 502(a)(3) is a “catchall” provision that “[acts] as a safety net,
offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does
not elsewhere adequately remedy.”186 However, the Court limited that expansive view
in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, restricting § 502(a)(3) to
provide only “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity.”187 The
Court explained that “[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking . . . to compel the defendant
to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has
traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting
for the defendant’s breach of legal duty.”188 Because money damages constitute legal,
rather than equitable, relief, they are unavailable under § 502(a)(3).189 In a footnote,
the Court observed that while backpay is a type of restitution, no case law directly
states that “since it is restitutionary, it is therefore equitable. . . . Congress ‘treated
[backpay] as equitable’ in Title VII only in the narrow sense that it allowed backpay
to be awarded together with equitable relief.”190 Thus, the Court distinguished statutes
that specifically include monetary damages as parcel to an equitable remedy from
183. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
184. ERISA § 502(a)(3) (2006) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary

. . . . to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”).

185. 516 U.S. 489, 489 (1996).
186. Id. at 512.
187. 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002). While this author would strenuously argue that Great-West was poorly

decided, such an argument is beyond the scope of this note. Instead, this note hopes to identify ways to
obtain favorable judgments using the case law available. For excellent critiques of Great-West, see John
H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By ‘Equitable’: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens,
and Great West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317 (2003), and Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents
Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1063 (2003).

188. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting)).

189. See id.
190. Id. at 218 n.4.
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those that do not.191 Under the latter situation (exemplified by § 502(a)(3)), the
majority’s dicta seemed to state that restitutionary, “free standing claim[s] for money
damages” do not constitute equitable remedies under ERISA.192
After Great-West, it is clear that ERISA does not support the same make-whole
remedies found in other employment statutes.193 There is an emerging consensus in
the circuits that prejudgment interest is sometimes still available under § 502(a)(3)
for claims of disgorgement (considered a traditionally equitable remedy under GreatWest 194), in that the remedy intends to provide the plaintiff with any profit made
from the investment of illegally withheld plan funds.195 However, it is not clear that
this theory is applicable to all claims under § 502(a)(3), and some courts have even
questioned whether, after Great-West, the provision supports the basic remedy of
backpay in ERISA § 510 actions.196 Unlike most arguments relating to prejudgment
191. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally

engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.” (emphasis added)), with ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) (“A civil action may
be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . . . . to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”).
The court differentiated the two provisions by stating that with Title VII, Congress specifically added
backpay to the traditional equitable remedy of reinstatement; because the term “backpay” was not
specifically included in ERISA § 502, the phrase “equitable” only encompassed reinstatement.

192. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4.
193. See Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 2007 ) (“This appeal addresses whether,

under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), ‘other appropriate equitable relief ’ permits recovery of
extra contractual, or ‘make-whole’ damages in the form of payment of life insurance benefits that would
have accrued to a plan beneficiary but for a plan fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty. Constrained by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson . . . we must deny
relief.”).

194. Id.
195. See Parke v. First Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1006–09 (8th Cir. 2004) (prejudgment

interest remains available under disgorgement theory); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d
193, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same);
Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs., 196 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D. Conn. 2002) (same); Carson v. Tex. Based
Furniture Movers Plan, 36 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1259 (N.D. Tex. 2005).

196. See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (backpay is not a remedy for

ERISA § 510 claim for discriminatory discharge); Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593,
598 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We agree with the conclusion that Great-West ‘appears to foreclose Strom’s
‘make-whole’ remedial scheme.’” (quoting De Pace v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 257 F. Supp. 2d
543, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)); Lance v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1584 (E.D.
Mich. 2009) (same). But see Millsap, 368 F.3d at 52–55 (Lucero, J. dissenting) (“Consistent with the
purposes of ERISA and contrary to the majority’s result, our previous cases that have considered the
nature of back pay in other employment contexts have held that back pay is, in fact, equitable. Similarly,
it is undisputed that an injunction ordering an employee’s return to work—reinstatement—is equitable
relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), and that as a general rule, back pay is considered an equitable remedy
when it is intertwined with injunctive relief or made an integral part of an overall equitable remedy. In
the context of § 510 violations, ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes what has been termed in other statutory
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interest, the disgorgement theory does not support ITLAs because a third party—for
our purposes the taxing government—receives the benefit of the employer’s illegal
act in the form of increased tax revenues, as opposed to the employer holding that
additional tax amount for its own gain. The result is that, while the employer created
the employee’s increased tax burden, it does not stand in possession of that sum, as
the sum is only created upon the taxation of the plaintiff. Thus, it is impossible for
the increased tax liability to be a separate, distinguishable sum of money that might
be set aside in a constructive trust and then disgorged by a court as legal relief.
However, strong arguments exist for court-made ITLAs under ERISA § 502(a)(1)
(B). Section 502(a)(1)(B) is more specific than § 502(a)(3),197 stating that: “A civil action
may be brought by a participant or beneficiary . . . . to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”198 In Skretvedt v. E.I.
Dupont De Nemours, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that
prejudgment interest is properly considered “part of his or her award of delayed ERISA
benefits,” and therefore are available in cases that come under § 502(a)(1)(B).199
In a footnote, the Skretvedt court analyzed the plaintiff ’s motion for an ITLA as
additional equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)(B).200 The court held that it did not
constitute “additional equitable relief ” under Great-West because it was “an ordinary
claim for money damages as compensation for losses suffered.”201 The Skretvedt court
ignored the possibility that the award, like the prejudgment interest award, might be
available under § 502(a)(1)(B). The ITLA is a necessary “part of his or her award of
delayed ERISA benefits” because without the increase, a plaintiff will not receive a
portion of the benefits she would have received if the benefits were provided in a
timely, legal manner.202 Thus, while § 502(a)(3) precludes ERISA plaintiffs from
obtaining ITLAs, courts can, and should, make such awards under § 502(a)(1)(B).
Because the Eshelman court has since explained that an ITLA is a part of a plaintiff ’s
complete backpay remedy, the Third Circuit should revisit Skretvedt and analyze the
award as a part of the benefits owed to the plaintiff under § 502(a)(1)(B). 203
contexts as the ‘conventional remedy’ of reinstatement with back pay. This equitable remedy is consistent
with labor-protective legislation dating back to the New Deal, and is consistent with ERISA’s primary
purposes.” (citations omitted)). Because an ITLA is part of a plaintiff ’s complete backpay compensation,
it would constitute part of the backpay award advocated as available under the dissent in Millsap.
197. See ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) (2006) (referring to “other appropriate equitable relief ”).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
199. 372 F.3d 193, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We now make explicit that an ERISA plaintiff who prevails

under § 502(a)(1)(B) in seeking an award of benefits may request prejudgment interest under that section
as part of his or her benefits award.” (citations omitted)).

200. Id. at 204 n.15.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 207.
203. This argument applies with equal force to backpay awards under § 510 as advocated for in the dissent of

Millsap. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1261–66 (Lucero, J. dissenting).
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In sum, after Eshelman, courts should provide ERISA plaintiffs with ITLAs for
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claims because, like prejudgment interest awards, ITLAs are necessary
for certain plaintiffs “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan”;204
without it, the plaintiff would receive an amount less than what the plan owed her
absent ERISA violations. Because the plan committed the illegal action, the plan
should suffer all of the consequences needed to place the plan participant in a
situation equal to that where no illegal action occurred. However, due to Great-West,
§ 502(a)(3) currently precludes plaintiffs from obtaining relief for their increased tax
liability, a situation that will likely continue until the Court clarifies its reasoning or
Congress amends ERISA to address the Great-West decision.
E. Additional Employment Claims

In addition to applying ITLAs under the foregoing five federal statutes,
whistleblower statutes are also similar to anti-discrimination statutes, in that they
protect certain employees who provide information about their employer’s illegal
actions from retaliation. Because these statutes are often narrowly tailored to specific
industries, they are not analyzed in this section. However, because they are normally
modeled after other anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, 205 Eshelman can
be applied wholesale as demonstrated by the discussion of §§ 1981 and 1983 above—
with the exception of suits against the federal government (barring, of course, a
situation where Congress waived its sovereign immunity). Many state statutes also
provide make-whole remedies for employees who are subjected to illegal treatment
under state employment law; the arguments presented above apply with equal force
to those statutes, anti-discrimination or otherwise.206
V. CONCLUSION

In 1943, Congress recognized the need for income averaging in situations where
an employee receives backpay through court order, and it provided those plaintiffs
with relief by statute. Congress expanded those provisions in 1964 as part of an
experiment in tax law, hoping to create greater horizontal equity within the tax system.
However, the system in practice was ineffective and intimidated taxpayers. As part of
a simplification of the tax code, Congress ended its income averaging experiment in
1986, inadvertently closing off any ability for employee plaintiffs to mitigate their
increased tax liability resulting from the receipt of backpay in one lump sum.
204. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) (2006).
205. See Robert Johnson, Comment, Whistling While You Work: Expanding Whistleblower Laws to Include Non-

Workplace-Related Retaliation After Burlington Northern v. White, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1337, 1351
(2008) (“Whistleblower retaliation protections are largely modeled after Title VII’s retaliation
provision.”).

206. Indeed some state courts have addressed this issue. See Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers, 87 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2004) (providing ITLAs under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination);
Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (providing ITLAs under the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination).
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Slowly, courts began to address this inequitable feature of current tax law through
additional awards to offset that increased tax liability. In 2009, the Eshelman court
made a definitive ruling on the issue, providing other courts with a clear line of
reasoning as to why such awards are permissible under employment discrimination
statutes. That ruling failed to explain when courts should provide plaintiffs with
ITLAs and unnecessarily cabined its reasoning to anti-discrimination statutes. This
note argues that ITLAs should be made by courts when a plaintiff provides accurate
calculations of her projected increased tax liability using the most recent information
reasonably obtainable.207 A warning for plaintiffs: the award must be calculated in a
manner that determines the plaintiff ’s additional liability, as opposed to total liability.
Thus, it will be necessary to determine what taxes would have been owed if the
plaintiff had received the backpay in normal course of business (x), what additional
taxes must be paid as a result of the lump sum award (y) (calculated by adding the
backpay award to current projected income and multiplying that by the appropriate
tax percentages, and then subtracting the amount that plaintiff would have paid in
taxes if no backpay was received), and then to subtract y from x. The result will be
plaintiff ’s increased tax liability.208
After analyzing the applicability of ITLAs when backpay is awarded under five
different federal statutes, I conclude that the award is available in most instances.
Courts should continue to expand the use of this award to all anti-discrimination
statutes and, beyond that, to all applicable employment statutes. In terms of fairness,
it only makes sense to provide plaintiffs with this type of award. A plaintiff ’s increased
tax liability comes as a direct result of her employer’s actions; once an employer is
found to have made an impermissible employment action, it is the duty of the court
and employer to ensure that the plaintiff is placed in a position equal to where she
would have been absent the illegal conduct.209 Employment statutes, when regulating
wages and benefits, are best viewed as anti-theft statutes; indeed, the withholding of
money or benefits owed to employees is no more than clever, nuanced robbery. If
someone were to steal a car, the fair response upon a finding of guilt would be the
replacement of that car, as it was before the theft, along with any additional costs
207. The term “accurate” in this context refers to whether the calculations, if all of the information used is

correct, would result in a determination of “actual” tax liability.

208. In a simple example that assumes tax burdens remain static over the next ten years, beginning in 2010:

Employee A makes minimum wage, $7.25 per hour, working forty hours a week. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).
After bringing a successful FLSA claim against her employer for minimum-wage violations, A is
retaliated against over the next ten years. She brings an FLSA retaliation claim and receives a $100,000
backpay award. If no retaliation had occurred, she would have received $25,080 per year (about $12 per
hour). X would equal $15,000 in unpaid taxes (calculated by subtracting the taxes owed on $25,080
from the taxes owed on $15,080 (full time minimum wage salary), multiplied by 10). Y would equal
$24,089 (calculated by subtracting the taxes owed on $15,080 from the taxes owed on $115,080). Thus,
A would incur an federal increased tax liability of $9089 (Y – X). A useful tool on the Internet to quickly
determine an individual’s tax burden can be found at Federal Tax Brackets, Moneychimp, supra note 20.
For examples and explanations on how to make increased tax liability calculations in more complicated
settings, see Ben-Zion, supra note 15.

209. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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incurred through the illegal act, such as tow charges and the like. In the case where
an employee receives a lump sum that creates an increased tax liability, the employee
receives a damaged car that requires costly repair before it is operational; hardly a
make-whole remedy. Courts already universally apply prejudgment interest awards in
situations of backpay, acknowledging that an award of backpay alone is not consistent
with a make-whole remedy. The case is the same when a plaintiff is subjected to
higher taxation as a result of succeeding in an employment claim. Courts must act
upon that reality by expanding the application of ITLAs to all employment claims.
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